Hello, Thanks for this article on Cuba's current situation. A few comments:
1. You state Cuba "has no equivalent" successor structure as if it's established fact. What's the sourcing? This reads as speculation, not analysis.
2. The regime's "bloodbath" warning is standard deterrence rhetoric, or should we say "propaganda"?
3. The blackouts are not primarily a Trump-era creation. Cuba's energy grid has been failing since the 1990s. Framing a decades-old structural crisis as a consequence of recent sanctions lets the Cuba government mismanagement off the hook.
4. On the energy minister's claim that reserves are "exhausted", let me point that the regime somehow has enough fuel to deploy its repressive apparatus against recent street protesters. And Cuban private enterprises, many of them tied to the political elite, have been importing oil with U.S. authorization.
5. Most importantly: the claim that Obama's opening "was never given time to mature" because Trump reversed it is factually wrong. Fidel Castro published "El hermano Obama" in Granma on March 27, 2016 — days after Obama's visit — a scathing rejection that became the hardliners' blueprint for blocking reform. The Cuban government killed the thaw before Trump ever took office.
6. And last but not least, as usual in American analysis about Cuba: the voices of actual Cubans — protesters, independent journalists, civil society — are nowhere in this piece. If we're asking "then what," shouldn't we ask the people who'll live with the answer?
1. How do you assess Sweden’s choice of the French FDI frigates over the UK option? Was it a smart pragmatic decision or a missed opportunity for better Baltic capability?
2. How well suited is the FDI for high-threat littoral waters like the Baltic, particularly regarding anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures?
3. What is your view on the risk that the FDI, as a relatively new design, may still have immature systems requiring significant upgrades after delivery?
4. By 2030–2034, when these ships arrive, do you expect the FDI’s strong air defense focus to still match the evolving Baltic threat environment?
5. What are the advantages and risks for Sweden in becoming heavily dependent on French supply chains and support for such a strategic platform?
6. What lessons should other navies, such as Saudi Arabia’s, draw from Sweden’s procurement process?
7. Does this deal represent meaningful progress toward European naval autonomy, or is it mainly a short-term solution for Sweden’s NATO needs?
Ms. Labott, there is one thing Cuba has going for it. There are plenty of Cuban exiles ready to go back home with the know-how to make Cuba the paradise it once was. That should be the end game.
What fools the current leaders are. They could live out the rest of their lives in comfort in Cuba or like Assad in Russia. The same goes for Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Take care.
Thor was very good Elise.
Hello, Thanks for this article on Cuba's current situation. A few comments:
1. You state Cuba "has no equivalent" successor structure as if it's established fact. What's the sourcing? This reads as speculation, not analysis.
2. The regime's "bloodbath" warning is standard deterrence rhetoric, or should we say "propaganda"?
3. The blackouts are not primarily a Trump-era creation. Cuba's energy grid has been failing since the 1990s. Framing a decades-old structural crisis as a consequence of recent sanctions lets the Cuba government mismanagement off the hook.
4. On the energy minister's claim that reserves are "exhausted", let me point that the regime somehow has enough fuel to deploy its repressive apparatus against recent street protesters. And Cuban private enterprises, many of them tied to the political elite, have been importing oil with U.S. authorization.
5. Most importantly: the claim that Obama's opening "was never given time to mature" because Trump reversed it is factually wrong. Fidel Castro published "El hermano Obama" in Granma on March 27, 2016 — days after Obama's visit — a scathing rejection that became the hardliners' blueprint for blocking reform. The Cuban government killed the thaw before Trump ever took office.
6. And last but not least, as usual in American analysis about Cuba: the voices of actual Cubans — protesters, independent journalists, civil society — are nowhere in this piece. If we're asking "then what," shouldn't we ask the people who'll live with the answer?
All fair points and good food for thought. Thanks for weighing in.
1. How do you assess Sweden’s choice of the French FDI frigates over the UK option? Was it a smart pragmatic decision or a missed opportunity for better Baltic capability?
2. How well suited is the FDI for high-threat littoral waters like the Baltic, particularly regarding anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures?
3. What is your view on the risk that the FDI, as a relatively new design, may still have immature systems requiring significant upgrades after delivery?
4. By 2030–2034, when these ships arrive, do you expect the FDI’s strong air defense focus to still match the evolving Baltic threat environment?
5. What are the advantages and risks for Sweden in becoming heavily dependent on French supply chains and support for such a strategic platform?
6. What lessons should other navies, such as Saudi Arabia’s, draw from Sweden’s procurement process?
7. Does this deal represent meaningful progress toward European naval autonomy, or is it mainly a short-term solution for Sweden’s NATO needs?
https://cashflowcollective.substack.com/p/swedens-43bn-frigate-decision-speed?r=4yoyh3&utm_medium=ios
https://aaronruby.substack.com/p/us-terrorism-against-cuba?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=7jhui4
Ms. Labott, there is one thing Cuba has going for it. There are plenty of Cuban exiles ready to go back home with the know-how to make Cuba the paradise it once was. That should be the end game.
What fools the current leaders are. They could live out the rest of their lives in comfort in Cuba or like Assad in Russia. The same goes for Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Take care.